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Abstract—Present-day public-key cryptosystems such as RSA
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) will become insecure
when quantum computers become a reality. This paper presents
the new state of the art in efficient software implementations
of a post-quantum secure public-key encryption scheme based
on the ring-LWE problem. We use a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4F
microcontroller as the target platform. Our contribution includes
optimization techniques for fast discrete Gaussian sampling and
efficient polynomial multiplication. Our implementation beats all
known software implementations of ring-LWE encryption by a
factor of at least 7. We further show that our scheme beats ECC-
based public-key encryption schemes by at least one order of
magnitude. At medium-term security we require 121 166 cycles
per encryption and 43 324 cycles per decryption, while at a long-
term security we require 261 939 cycles per encryption and 96 520
cycles per decryption. Gaussian sampling is done at an average
of 28.5 cycles per sample.
Index Terms—ring learning with errors (ring-LWE), software
implementation, post-quantum secure, public-key encryption, dis-
crete Gaussian sampling, number theoretic transform
I. INTRODUCTION
Our present day public-key cryptography schemes use num-
ber theoretic problems such as factoring or discrete log-
arithms for providing digital signatures, key-exchange, and
confidentiality. For sufficiently large key sizes, these public-
key cyptosystems are practically unbreakable with present day
computers, super computers, and special hardware clusters. In
1994 Peter Shor proposed a quantum algorithm [1] for integer
factorization. A modified version of Shor’s algorithm can solve
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Shor’s
algorithms cannot be used on classical computers, and can only
execute on powerful quantum computers to solve the factoring
or the discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time. In the
present decade, significant research is being performed to de-
velop powerful quantum computers. Therefore, it is imperative
that efficient quantum secure public-key algorithms are used
when quantum computers become a reality.
The learning with errors (LWE) problem and its efficient
ring variant (the ring-LWE problem) are related to well known
worst-case problems over lattices, and hence are considered to
be secure in the post-quantum world. In this paper we describe
an efficient software implementation of an encryption scheme
based on the ring-LWE problem [2]. The ring-LWE encryption
scheme is computationally intensive, and uses polynomial arith-
metic and discrete Gaussian sampling as primitive functions.
While addition and subtraction of large polynomials are easy
to implement, efficient design decisions are key for implement-
ing polynomial multiplication. Similarly, an efficient discrete
Gaussian sampler improves the performance of encryption.
In recent years several practical implementations based on
the ring-LWE problem were published. The first implemen-
tation [3] includes a hardware-based architecture and a high-
level software implementation. It uses a Number Theoretic
Transform (NTT) based polynomial multiplier and a rejection
sampler. In [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] more efficient hardware
implementations reduced the area and timing requirements.
While several high-level software implementations of the ring-
LWE based encryption scheme exist [3], [9], there are few
efficient software implementations on resource constrained mi-
crocontrollers [10], [11], [12]. Our everyday lives are permeated
by these devices, and they are increasingly becoming intercon-
nected, even over the Internet. This raises security concerns, as
these devices handle sensitive information and are sometimes
critical for the safety of human lives.
Our Contributions: This paper presents an implementation of
the ring-LWE encryption scheme on the ARM Cortex-M4F
microcontroller1 Our design goals include high speed and low
memory consumption. Our contributions are as follows:
1) Fast discrete Gaussian Sampling: We use the Knuth-
Yao sampling algorithm to implement a fast discrete Gaussian
sampler. We investigate acceleration techniques to improve the
sampler based on the architecture of the microcontroller. The
platform’s built-in True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is
used to generate random numbers. Lookup tables are used to
accelerate the sampling algorithm in the most frequently used
regions of the Gaussian distribution. This allows us to sample
at an average of 28.5 cycles per sample.
2) Efficient Polynomial Multiplication: We use the negative-
wrapped NTT along with computational optimizations from [7]
to implement the polynomial multiplication. The architecture’s
large word size is used to store multiple coefficients in each
processor word, and the basic negative-wrapped iterative NTT
algorithm is unrolled by a factor two. This reduces the number
of memory accesses and loop overhead by 50%. We demon-
strate that a polynomial multiplication of 256 elements can be
done in 108 147 cycles.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we provide a
mathematical background to help readers understand the paper.
Next, we discuss the implementation details. We analyse the
bottlenecks in standard algorithms, and provide solutions to
overcome these, with a specific focus on the target platform.
Afterwards, we present our results and finally we draw a
conclusion.
II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
In this section we provide a brief mathematical overview and
related references that might be helpful for the reader.
A. The ring-LWE Encryption Scheme
In the ring-LWE problem [13] two polynomials a and s are
chosen uniformly from a polynomial ring Rq = Zq[x]/〈f〉
1Source code available at http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~ssinharo
where f is an irreducible polynomial of degree n − 1. An
error polynomial e of degree n is sampled from an error
distribution X . The error distribution is usually a discrete
Gaussian distribution Xσ with standard deviation σ. The ring-
LWE distribution As,X over Rq × Rq consists of tuples (a, t)
where t = a · s+e ∈ Rq . Given a polynomial number of sample
pairs (a, t) from As,X , it is very difficult to find s. This problem
is known as the search ring-LWE problem. An encryption
scheme based on the ring-LWE problem was proposed in [2]. In
this paper, we use an efficient version of the encryption scheme
[7] which minimizes the number of costly NTT operations. We
denote NTT of a polynomial z by z˜.
1) KeyGeneration(a˜): Two polynomials r1 and r2 are
sampled from Xσ using a discrete Gaussian sampler. The
following computations are performed.
r˜1 ← NTT (r1); r˜2 ← NTT (r2); p˜1 ← r˜1 − a˜ ∗ r˜2
The private key is r˜2 and the public key is (a˜, p˜).
2) Encryption(a˜, p˜,m): The input message m is encoded
to a polynomial m¯ ∈ Rq . Error polynomials e1, e2, e3 ∈
Rq are generated from Xσ using a discrete Gaussian
sampler. The following computations are performed to
compute the ciphertext (c˜1, c˜2).
e˜1 ← NTT (e1); e˜2 ← NTT (e2)
(c˜1, c˜2)←
(
a˜ ∗ e˜1 + e˜2; p˜ ∗ e˜1 +NTT (e3 + m¯)
)
3) Decryption(c˜1, c˜2, r˜2): The inverse NTT is performed to
compute m′ = INTT (c˜1 ∗ r˜2 + c˜2) ∈ Rq . The original
message m is recovered from m′ by using a decoder.
We use the parameter sets (n, q,σ) from [3], namely P1 =
(256, 7 681, 11.31/
√
2pi) and P2 = (512, 12 289, 12.18/
√
2pi)
that have medium-term and long-term security respectively.
B. Discrete Gaussian Sampling
The ring-LWE cryptosystem requires samples from a discrete
Gaussian distribution to construct the error polynomials during
the key generation and encryption operations. There are various
methods for sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution.
The most well known techniques are rejection sampling, in-
version sampling, and the random bit model. Efficiency (time
and space) of the sampling algorithms depends on the standard
deviation σ of the distribution. A detailed comparative analysis
of the sampling algorithms can be found in [14]. We use the
Knuth-Yao algorithm [15] to sample from a discrete Gaussian
distribution. The Knuth-Yao algorithm is based on the random-
bit model and uses, on average, a near-optimal number of
random bits. This algorithm requires storage of the probabilities
of the sample points. The small standard deviation in the ring-
LWE encryption scheme means that the memory requirement
is small and can easily be satisfied on microcontrollers.
Tail and precision bounds: The tail of a discrete Gaussian
is infinitely long and the probability values have infinitely
large precision. Thus for a practical implementation, there is
a tail and precision bound for a required bit-security. We use
sufficiently large precision and tail-bound [14], [6] to maintain
a maximum statistical distance of 2−90 to the true distribution.
C. Polynomial Multiplication
For large polynomial multiplications, the Fast Fourier Trans-
form (FFT) is considered as the fastest algorithm due to
its O(n log n) complexity. In this paper we use the Number
Theoretic Transform (NTT) which corresponds to a FFT where
the primitive roots of unity are from a finite ring (thus integers)
instead of complex numbers. For efficient implementation,
we perform polynomial arithmetic in Rq = Zq[x]/〈f〉 with
f = xn + 1, and n = 2k and q a prime such that q ≡ 1
mod 2n. Such a choice of the parameters allows us to use an
n-point NTT instead of a 2n-point NTT during a polynomial
multiplication in Rq . However there is an additional scaling
overhead associated with the negative wrapped convolution.
This technique is known as the negative wrapped convolution.
We use the optimizations from [7] during the NTT computation.
In this paper we use the steps from [7] to implement
a fast encryption scheme. The encryption operation samples
three error polynomials, computes three forward NTTs, two
coefficient-wise polynomial multiplications, and three polyno-
mial additions. The decryption computes one coefficient-wise
polynomial multiplication, one polynomial addition, and one
inverse NTT. For more details the reader is referred to [7].
III. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we describe our ring-LWE implementation
based on an ARM platform. After introducing the target device,
we describe techniques for efficient sampling from a Gaussian
distribution, efficient polynomial multiplication, and finally
random number generation.
A. Target Device
Our design was implemented on the ARM Cortex-M4F,
which is a popular and powerful embedded platform. It has
a 32-bit word size, 13 general-purpose registers, its instruction
set supports performing single-cycle 32-bit multiplications, 16-
bit SIMD arithmetic, and a division instruction that requires
between 2-12 cycles, depending on the input parameters. We
make use of STMicroelectronics’ STM32F407 chip, which
includes an ARM Cortex-M4F with a maximum clock speed
of 168 MHz, 192 KB of SRAM, and a hardware-based TRNG.
B. Gaussian Sampler
The discrete Gaussian sampler deserves special attention,
as the efficient implementation of this component has a big
performance impact on the ring-LWE cryptosystem. In our im-
plementation, each encryption operation requires 3n samples.
1) Knuth-Yao Algorithm: This algorithm [15] performs a
random walk along a binary tree known as the discrete dis-
tribution generating (DDG) tree. A DDG tree is related to the
probabilities of the sample points. The binary expansions of the
probabilities are written in matrix form with binary elements,
referred to as the probability matrix Pmat. Each row of Pmat
corresponds to the probability of sampling a random number at
a discrete position from the Gaussian distribution. Each element
of Pmat represents a node in the binary tree, with each non-
zero element corresponding to a terminal node. Each column
of Pmat corresponds to a level in the DDG tree.
Alg. 1 shows a listing of the algorithm. The DDG tree
is constructed on-the-fly, eliminating the need for storing the
entire tree. During a sampling operation a random walk is
performed starting from the root of the DDG tree. Each random
walk consumes a single random bit to travel from one level
of the tree to the next. The distance counter d represents
the number of intermediate nodes to the right side of the
visited node. Each non-zero node that is visited, decrements the
Input: Probability matrix P , random number r, modulus q
Output: Sample value s
1 for col← 0 to MAXCOL do
2 d← 2d+ (r&1)
3 r ← r  1
4 for row ←MAXROW downto 0 do
5 d← d− P [row][col]
6 if d = −1 then
7 if (r&1) = 1 then
8 return q − row
9 else
10 return row
11 return 0
Algorithm 1: Knuth-Yao Sampling.
distance counter by one. When the distance counter is finally
decremented to below zero, the terminal node is found, and
the current row number of the probability matrix represents
the sample. As the probability matrix only contains the positive
half of the Gaussian distribution, a random bit is used to decide
the sign of the sample. As our scheme performs all operations
modulo q, the negative number is found by q− row. For more
details the reader is referred to [6], [14].
The bit-scanning operation in Alg. 1 is expensive: in the inner
loop each bit of a column is extracted from Pmat, subtracted
from d, after which the sign of d is checked. Loop overhead
exists in each inner loop iteration: the row index needs to
be updated, and checked against its lower bound. We further
need to read multiple words from each column. Therefore,
each iteration of the inner loop requires at least 8 cycles for:
updating and bounds checking of d and the loop overhead
from the row index. While this seems like a small amount,
it becomes significant when you consider that Pmat consists of
5 995 bits in our design for s = 11.31. The following discusses
several optimization techniques for software implementations
of the Knuth-Yao algorithm. These techniques mostly focus on
reducing the number of scanned bits.
2) Storing the probability matrix in column form: Alg. 1
requires consecutive accesses to elements from different rows
in the same column in Pmat. To keep the number of memory
accesses low, Pmat is stored in a column-wise form. Storage
of Pmat with s = 11.31 requires 55 rows and 109 columns to
provide a precision of 2−90. As each column contains only 55
bits, 9 bits are wasted when a column is stored in two 32-bit
words. The following optimizations assume that the matrix is
stored in column-wise form.
3) Reducing the number of stored elements: From Alg. 1 we
can see that processing a zero has no effect, as the distance d is
not altered. It is therefore desireable to only process and store
the region of the matrix that contains non-zero elements. The
Hamming weight between two consecutive columns increases
at most by one; thereby causing a large number of zeros to
exist in the bottom left-hand corner of the probability matrix,
as shown in Fig. 1.
Multiple processor words are required to store each column
(section III-B2), and as we would like to avoid the ineffectual
bit-scanning operation on zero words, we store only the non-
zero words of the probability matrix, as zero words require no
processing. For s = 11.31 this technique allowed us to reduce
the number of stored words from 218 to 180.
4) Skipping Unnecessary Bit Scanning: A terminal node is
located in a particular level when the value of the distance d is
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Fig. 1. The partial contents of a probability matrix. We avoid storing zero
words (represented by the blue box) as they do not need to be processed.
less than the Hamming weight of the associated column of the
probability matrix. The authors in [6] proposed to store each
column’s Hamming weight in memory. The Hamming weights
are used to avoid performing bit scanning on any column that
would not reduce the distance d to a negative number, thereby
avoiding columns in which a terminal node will not be found.
This method requires storage for the Hamming weights, as well
as logic in the outer loop to check if a terminal node will be
discovered in the current level.
We propose another solution to avoid the bit-scanning op-
eration completely on all non-zero elements of the probability
matrix. A useful feature to do this on our target microcontroller
is an instruction that counts the number of leading zeros, called
clz. The current column word is stored in a register, and
in each iteration of the inner loop clz is used to skip the
consecutive leading zeros of the elements of a column that still
requires processing. Next, the processed bits are left-shifted,
and the inner loop repeats until the register is equal to zero.
5) Lookup Tables: Fig. 2 shows that the probability of
sampling within the first few levels of the tree is already very
high. For s = 11.31 a terminal node has a probability of
97.27% to be located within the first 8 levels and 99.87% to be
located within the first 13 levels of the DDG tree. This can be
exploited by using a lookup table (LUT) to represent the levels
of the DDG tree that are closest to the mean, as they have a
much higher likelihood of containing a terminal node.
An LUT that represents the first 8 columns is generated by
using an 8-bit index (instead of a random number) as an input
to Alg. 1, and the results are saved in a 256-element lookup
table. There is a small probability that a terminal node will not
be discovered in the first 8 levels. Each index that does not
lead to a terminal node within the first 8 levels, will cause a
lookup failure, which is indicated in the most significant bit of
the corresponding lookup table element.
Alg. 2 shows how the costly bit-scanning operation for
the first 8 levels is replaced by an inexpensive table lookup
operation. Sampling is performed with an 8-bit random number
as an index to the LUT. The lookup is successful if the most
significant bit of the lookup result is zero, after which the
algorithm returns the lookup result. A lookup failure occurs if
the most significant bit of the lookup result is one. The distance
d is then assigned to the lookup result with the most significant
bit cleared, followed by the bit-scanning operation (Alg. 1).
The efficiency of the algorithm can further be increased by
using a second lookup table to represent level 9 up to level 13
Input: Probability matrix P , random number r, modulus q
Output: Sample value s
1 index← r&255
2 r ← r  8
3 s← LUT1[index]
4 if msb(s) = 0 then
5 if (r&1) = 1 then
6 return q − s
7 else
8 return s
9 d← s&7
10 col← 0
11 for col← 8 to MAXCOL do
12 d← 2d+ (r&1)
13 r ← r  1
14 for row ←MAXROW downto 0 do
15 d← d− P [row][col]
16 if d = −1 then
17 if (r&1) = 1 then
18 return q − row
19 else
20 return row
21 return 0
Algorithm 2: Knuth-Yao Sampling with an LUT
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Fig. 2. The probability that the Knuth-Yao sampling algorithm finds a terminal
node within x levels for a Gaussian distribution with σ = 11.31/
√
2pi.
of the DDG tree. The second LUT is generated in a similar
way to the first LUT. The 8-bit index now consists of a 5-bit
random number concatenated with the 3-bit distance d. After
a failed lookup in the first LUT, a lookup in the second LUT
checks if the terminal node lies inside level 9 through level 13.
The most significant bit of the lookup result is checked for a
lookup failure. If the most significant bit of the lookup result
is zero, the lookup was successful, and the algorithm quits by
returning the lookup result. However, if the most significant
bit of the lookup result is one, a lookup failure has occurred.
Next, the distance d is set to the low 4 bits of the lookup result,
followed by the bit-scanning operation on the remaining levels.
For a Gaussian distribution with σ = 11.31/
√
2pi we found
that all failed lookups from the first LUT has a distance d
between 0 and 6. As the second LUT index, which consists
partly of the parameter d, now has a limited range of values that
will ever be set, the LUT can be stored in only 224 elements.
C. Polynomial Multiplication
In this section we discuss the building blocks for fast multi-
plication based on the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT).
The basic negative-wrapped iterative algorithm for NTT
computation is shown in Alg. 3. This algorithm has inef-
ficiencies coming from memory accesses in non-consecutive
locations. First, two coefficients are read from non-consecutive
locations. Next, some processing is performed on these two
coefficients, and finally the two resulting coefficients are written
Input: Polynomial a(x) ∈ Zq [x] of degree n− 1 and the n-th primitive
root wn ∈ Zq of unity
Output: Polynomial A(x) ∈ Zq [x] = NTT (a)
1 A← BitReverse(a)
2 for m = 2 to n/2 step 2m do
3 wm ← primitiveroot(m) // wm = wn/mn
4 w =
√
wm
5 for j = 0 to m/2− 1 do
6 for k = 0 to n− 1 step m do
7 t← w ·A[m/2 + j + k] mod q
8 u← A[j + k]
9 A[j + k]← u+ t mod q
10 A[m/2 + j + k]← u− t mod q
11 w ← w · wm
Algorithm 3: Negative-Wrapped Iterative Fwd NTT
to non-consecutive locations. Each inner loop iteration requires
two pointer calculations to access the elements stored in the
non-consecutive memory locations. The inner loop further has
loop overhead from updating the index k, and checking it
against its upper bound.
Coefficients require only 13-bits or 14-bits of storage respec-
tively for q = 7 681 and q = 122 89, and therefore fits into
halfwords. On the target platform a memory access requires 2
cycles, regardless of whether it is to a halfword or a full word.
It is therefore wasteful to access halfwords, as two coefficients
can be stored in a 32-bit word, which can then be accessed in
the minimum number of cycles. The expensive calculation of
twiddle factors can be avoided by storing precomputed twiddle
factors, and inverse twiddle factors in a lookup table.
D. Efficient Polynomial Multiplication
We can reduce the number of memory accesses, pointer
operations, and loop overhead by 50% by performing a two-fold
unrolling of the inner loop, as shown in Alg. 4. Memory oper-
ations are reduced by storing two coefficients in a single 32-bit
word. In each iteration of the inner loop the following occurs:
two 32-bit words, each containing two coefficients are read
from memory, followed by arithmetic with these coefficients,
and finally the two resulting 32-bit words, each containing two
coefficients, are written to two different memory locations. The
inner loop still requires two pointer calculations, but now at
least each memory operation will access two coefficients in a
single memory location. The reduction in the loop overhead
comes from the two-fold unrolling of the inner loop, as index
k requires 50% fewer updates.
During encryption, three NTT operations are performed, one
after the other, on three different sets of coefficients. The
loop overhead and calculation of the parameter w has a non-
negligible cost. This cost can be reduced by performing the
three NTT operations in parallel inside the same inner loop.
By doing this, the cost is effectively reduced by 33%. Each of
the three sets of coefficients requires a pointer to its data set.
However, as the target only has 13 general-purpose registers,
we found it infeasible to keep all three pointers simultaneously
inside registers. To solve this, we propose to store the three
sets of coefficients in three consecutive memory locations
separated by n/2 addresses. This allows us to store only the
first coefficient set’s address in a register, as the remaining two
sets’ addresses can easily be calculated.
Input: Polynomial a(x) ∈ Zq [x] of degree n− 1, and lookup table
primitive root with the m-th primitive roots wm ∈ Zq of unity
Output: Polynomial A(x) ∈ Zq [x] = NTT (a)
1 A← BitReverse(a)
2 l← 1
3 for m = 2 to n/2 step 2m do
4 wm ← primitive root[l] // wm = wn/mn
5 w ← primitive root[l + 1] // w = √wm
6 for j = 0 to m− 1 step 2 do
7 for k = 0 to n/2− 1 step 2m do
8 (u1, t1)← (A[j + k],A[j + k + 1])
9 (u2, t2)← (A[m+ j + k],A[m+ j + k + 1])
10 t1 ← w · t1 mod q
11 t2 ← w · t2 mod q
12 A[j + k]← u1 + t1 mod q
13 A[j + k + 1]← u2 + t2 mod q
14 A[m+ j + k]← u1 − t1 mod q
15 A[m+ j + k + 1]← u2 − t2 mod q
16 w ← w · wm
17 l← l + 1
18 wm ← primitive root[l] // wm = wn
19 w ← primitive root[l + 1] // w = √wm
20 for k = 0 to n/2− 1 do
21 (u1, t1)← (A[2k],A[2k + 1])
22 t1 ← w · t1 mod q
23 A[2k]← u1 + t1 mod q
24 A[2k + 1]← u1 − t1 mod q
25 w ← w · wm
Algorithm 4: Memory Efficient Negative-Wrapped Fwd
NTT
E. Random Number Generation
The target platform’s TRNG uses a 48 MHz clock and can
generate a 32-bit random number every 40 clock cycles. The
microprocessor is clocked at 168 MHz, and can perform other
computations while waiting 12 cycles between each random
number request. According to [16] the TRNG passes all the
NIST statistical tests for secure random number generation.
Each call to the Knuth-Yao sampling algorithm requires
a varying amount of random bits. To reduce the number of
accesses to the TRNG, and thereby increase the efficiency
of our implementation, we propose to fetch a fresh random
number from the TRNG only when we run out of fresh random
bits. The random bits are stored in a register, and all used bits
are right-shifted out of the register. When the register contains
an insufficient number of fresh bits for the next operation,
a new random number is fetched. A register could be used
to keep a count of the number of fresh random bits in the
register. However, a limited number of registers are available,
and we can do better than this by counting the number of fresh
bits with the clz instruction. To ensure that clz reports the
correct number of used bits, we set each fresh random number’s
most significant bit to one. After all the fresh bits are used, the
register becomes one, and a new random number is fetched.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we present the performance results of our
ring-LWE implementation on the ARM Cortex-M4F. The
elapsed clock cycles are measured with the platform’s built-
in debug and trace unit (DWT), which contains a cycle count
register (DWT_CYCCNT). All routines were benchmarked by
obtaining the average cycle counts for 10 000 runs.
A. Performance Results
Table I shows that the NTT-based operations are at least
123% more for expensive for P2 when compared with P1, while
TABLE I
MEASURED RESULTS OF MAJOR OPERATIONS.
Operation P1 (Cycles) P2 (Cycles)
NTT transform 31 583 73 406
Parallel NTT transform 84 031 188 150
Inverse NTT transform 39 126 90 583
Knuth-Yao sampling 7 294 14 604
NTT multiplication 108 147 248 310
P1 = (256, 7 681, 11.31/
√
2pi), P2 = (512, 12 289, 12.18/
√
2pi)
TABLE II
MEASURED RESULTS FOR OUR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RING-LWE
ENCRYPTION SCHEME.
Operation Cycles Flash (B) RAM (B) Parameters
Key Generation 116 772 1 552 1 596 P1
Encryption 121 166 1 506 3 128 P1
Decryption 43 324 516 2 100 P1
Key Generation 263 622 1 552 3 132 P2
Encryption 261 939 1 506 6 200 P2
Decryption 96 520 516 4 148 P2
P1 = (256, 7 681, 11.31/
√
2pi), P2 = (512, 12 289, 12.18/
√
2pi)
Knuth-Yao sampling requires an average of 28.5 cycles per
sample for both parameter sets. The NTT and Inverse NTT
operations have roughly the same execution times. The Parallel
NTT operation consists of three NTT operations in parallel, and
outperforms 3 seperate NTT operations by 8.3%.
Table II shows that the code size has the same storage re-
quirement for both parameter sets, while the RAM requirement
increases by approx. 100% when comparing P2 with P1. Key
generation, encryption, and decryption each has a respective
increase in execution time of 126%, 118%, and 117% when
comparing P1 with P2. Decryption requires 35% fewer cycles
than encryption, while using 33% less RAM.
B. Performance Comparison
Table III shows that our results for the NTT transform require
27.5% less cycles than [10], and one order of magnitude less
cycles than [11]. The scheme proposed by [9] has parameters
n = 1024,σ = 8/
√
2pi while providing medium-term security.
The same security level can be provided with P1 which uses
three times fewer coefficients. Our result for NTT transfor-
mation is 72% faster than the Cortex-M4F based [10], while
being a factor 15.8 slower than [17], which uses a much more
powerful desktop processor. Our Gaussian sampler is faster than
any other software-based Gaussian sampler by a factor of 7.6.
Table IV shows that our implementation of the encryption
and decryption operations are faster than those of [12] by a
factor of 7.25 and 5.22 respectively.
In order to draw a comparison of our cryptosystem with more
estabelished public-key cryptosystems, we compare our imple-
mentation to an existing ECC implementation. We consider
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [18],
which has few known software implementations. The cycle cost
of the encryption operation is estimated based on the most per-
formance hungry operations, namely two point multiplications.
As our scheme provides medium-term security, we therefore
compare our results to an ECC implementation of 233-bits.
In [19] the authors found that a 233-bit point multiplication
requires 2 761 640 cycles on the ARM Cortex-M0+. This
means that an ECIES implementation would require roughly
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF MAJOR BUILDING BLOCKS IN
LATTICE-BASED POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOSYSTEMS.
Operation Platform Cycles n, q, σ
NTT transform [17] Core i5-3210M 4 480 P5
NTT transform [17] Core i3-2310 4 484 P5
NTT multiplication [17] Core i5-3210M 16 052 P5
NTT multiplication [17] Core i3-2310 16 096 P5
NTT transform [11] 1 ATxmega64A3 2 720 000 P3
NTT transform [10] Cortex-M4F 122 619 P3
NTT multiplication [10] Cortex-M4F 508 624 P3
NTT transform [12] ARM7TDMI 260 521 P3
NTT transform [12] ATMega64 2 207 787 P3
NTT transform ∗ Cortex-M4F 71 090 P2
NTT multiplication ∗ Cortex-M4F 237 803 P2
NTT transform [12] ARM7TDMI 109 306 P1
NTT transform [12] ATMega64 754 668 P1
NTT transform [11] 1 ATxmega64A3 1 216 000 P1
NTT multiplication [9] Core i5 4570R 342 800 P4
NTT transform ∗ Cortex-M4F 31 583 P1
NTT multiplication∗ Cortex-M4F 108 147.0 P1
Gaussian sampling [12] ARM7TDMI 218.6 P3
Gaussian sampling [12] ATmega64 1 206.3 P3
Gaussian sampling [9] Core i5 4570R 652.3 P4
Gaussian sampling [10] Cortex-M4F 1828.0 P3
Gaussian sampling ∗ Cortex-M4F 28.5 P1 and P2
∗ This work, P1 = (256, 7 681, 11.31/
√
2pi)
P2 = (512, 12 289, 12.18/
√
2pi), P3 = (512, 12 289, 215)
P4 = (1024, 232 − 1, 8/
√
2pi), P5 = (512, 8383489, -)
1 Cycles estimated from reported execution time with a clock speed of 32 MHz.
Note: For NTT transform and NTT multiplication P2 and P3 are equivalent. The
Gaussian sampling cycles are averaged for a single gaussian sampling operation.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF RING-LWE ENCRYPTION SCHEMES.
Platform Key Gen. Encrypt Decrypt n, q, σ
ARM7TDMI [12] 575 047 878 454 226 235 P1
ATMega64 [12] 2 770 592 3 042 675 1 368 969 P1
ATxmega64A3 [11] 2 - 5 024 000 2 464 000 P1
Core 2 Duo [3] 1 9 300 000 4 560 000 1 710 000 P1
Cortex-M4F∗ 117 009 121 166 43 324 P1
Core 2 Duo [3] 1 13 590 000 9 180 000 3 540 000 P2
Cortex-M4F∗ 252 002 261 939 96 520 P2
∗ This work
P1 = (256, 7 681, 11.31/
√
2pi), P2 = (512, 12 289, 12.18/
√
2pi)
1 Cycles estimated from reported execution time.
2 Cycles estimated from reported execution time with a clock speed of 32 MHz.
5 523 280 cycles for encryption. Therefore, our implementation
is faster than ECIES by more than one order of magnitude.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we demonstrate that it is possible to implement
a lattice-based post-quantum public-key cryptosystem on a
device as simple as a Cortex-M4F microcontroller. We showed
various implementation techniques to improve the efficiency of
the Knuth-Yao Gaussian sampler and the NTT-based multiplier.
These optimizations allow us to beat all known implementations
of ring-LWE encryption operations, and Gaussian sampling by
a factor of at least 7. We further demonstrate that our scheme
beats all ECC-based public-key encryption schemes by at least
one order of magnitude. Our implementation requires an aver-
age of 28.5 cycles per Gaussian sample, 121 166 and 43 324
cycles respectively for encryption and decryption at medium-
term security, and 261 939 and 96 520 cycles respectively for
long-term security, while using a modest amount of flash and
RAM.
For future work we plan to create an efficient implementation
for a Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) processor (e.g.,
ARM NEON). We further intend to extend our scheme to allow
for constant-time execution. Another interesting direction is to
use our optimization strategies on a signature-based protocol.
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